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PLAINS INDIAN AGRARIANISM AND 
CLASS CONFLICT 
RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH 
Relatively little has been done to trace the 
political structures of American Indians 
through the years 1890 to 1940, when reserva-
tion economics were undergoing their most 
dramatic changes. That failure has left the false 
impression of a fifty-vear institutional vacuum. 
In fact, the middle years were times of complex 
reJisrrihutions of power ;md the emergence of 
indigellous socioeconomic classes. It was also 
perhaps the earliest period in which Plains 
Indians enjoyed anything like an American-
style, decentralized elective democracy. 
Federal programs shifted the control of the 
Indians' food supply. From being skilled hunt-
er-organizers they became recipients of gc)\"ern-
nwnt patronage, heelme small landholders 
and, finally, tribal technocrats. In other words, 
they experienced two cycles of centralization. 
An agrarian entrepreneurial middle class and a 
RLl.\.\cl Barsh has taught law and imblic policy at 
the Universit:\' of Washington. Since 1984 he has 
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landless bureaucratic class emerged, and their 
competition for political influence has domi-
nated reservation life ever since. As in many 
developing countries, modernization was ac-
companied by a conflict between small-scale 
agrarian capitalism and central planning. 
If valid, this thesis requires reversing some 
well-entrenched historical judgments, i.c., that 
the Ceneral Allotment Act was bad because it 
reduced the Indians' aggregate landholdings, 
and that the Indian New Deal was good 
because it stopped allotment and encouraged 
Indian self-government. On the contrary, 
allotment may have given Indian leaders the 
opportunity to reestablish their economic and 
political independence from the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs-and the New Deal reorganiza-
tion program crushed this emergent Indian 
bourgeoisie and its growing power. 
TRADITIl,l\:AL MERITOCRACY 
Traditional Plains Indian leadership was 
earned and evolved through ceremonies of 
recognition by family and community.' With 
no fixed number of leaders and virtually 
universal competition for recognition, good 
people were able to rise to influence within 
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each family and eventually to win acknowl-
edgement as family representatives in the 
nation's councils.' This situation helped to 
maintain a certain balance of representation 
and power among families and obviated any 
lasting concentrations of control. 3 Thus, tradi-
tional government could best be described as 
an open-ended meritocracy with many gently 
competing poles of authority. 
Individual freedom was ensured by the 
representation of all families in council and by 
the requirement of consensus for national 
action. Equally important was the nature of 
the economy, which rewarded coordination 
but did not make it necessary for survival. 
Even the smallest family, functioning as a 
cooperative economic unit, could provide for 
itself under most circumstances. Only in times 
of war or disaster were wider economic and 
security arrangements unavoidable. Govern-
ment therefore functioned "at need" rather 
than as a permanent, coercive establishment. 
Although traditional leaders were not 
necessarily more productive as hunters, they 
were notable as facilitators of collective action 
(Service 1974, 50-51; Clastres 1974, 34; Ber-
nard 1928).4 This enabled them to accumulate 
a surplus of goods and obligations that could 
be mobilized, through sharing and gifting, to 
win support for their plans. In an economy 
based on unpredictable resources such as 
wildlife, moreover, even skillful producers 
faced periodic shortages. Family networks 
provided a system of social security against 
these unavoidable shortages, and individuals 
successful at collecting and reallocating re-
sources inevitably acquired a degree of influ-
ence and trust. Effective leadership depended 
on knowing how to distribute what had been 
produced. 
The traditional political system was none-
theless characterized by considerable social 
mobility (Goldschmidt 1959, 214). No one 
could control the economic factors crucial for 
survival. Wildlife was freely available, and 
productivity depended chiefly on individual 
skill and effort. Thus, while long-term social 
security benefited from the existence of family 
sharing networks, each individual's economic 
contribution to the family system was similar. 
THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM 
By the 1870s, traditional plains economies 
had been shattered by war, relocation, loss of 
hunting territories, destruction of game by 
railroad contractors, and restrictions on the 
movements of "Agency Indians." For at least a 
generation, most Indians were entirely depen-
dent on government aid for sustenance. Under 
these circumstances, reservation administra-
tors not surprisingly wielded power by control-
ling the distribution of rations, tools, and 
employment. "If you are an agitator, then you 
don't get so much; but if you are [an] 
undertaker you get more rations every time" 
(U.S. Senate 1929, 12378). 
Reservation agents themselves were politi-
cal appointees rather than civil servants until 
1907, and they well understood the power of 
patronage. Operating under a general policy of 
breaking traditional political institutions, 
agents identified the most cooperative men in 
the community and subsidized their campaigns 
for leadership (U.S. Senate 1929, 12442, 
12760). "The agent, having control of the food 
supply and its distribution, as well as control 
over the Indians' personal freedom, held power 
with which the chiefs could not compete" 
(MacGregor 1946, 35). 
Economic and political influence thus 
passed from individuals skilled at organizing 
Indians to those whom whites trusted to serve 
as conduits. Rewarding cooperative Indians 
with salaries as chiefs, policemen, judges, and 
clerks gave them the financial resources to 
build up their own following through philan-
thropy, competing with and ultimately displac-
ing the influence of the former leaders whose 
sources of wealth had disappeared. But while 
the superintendent's chiefs enjoyed economic 
privileges, they lacked any real power over 
reservation affairs. "They do no harm-or 
anything else," one contemporary Sioux writer 
observed ("Iktomi" 1937, 105). 
AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 
The allotment of agricultural lands among 
individual Indian households began in the 
1850s and was extended to all reservations in 
1887. Relative security of legal title created an 
opportunity for enterprising individuals to 
regain a limited degree of independence from 
the ration list (U.S. Senate 1929, 12503, 
12512). Farming and ranching also gave ambi-
tious men an opportunity to accumulate 
wealth outside the Bureau of Indian Affairs' 
patronage system and, through sharing and 
gifting, to establish themselves as autonomous 
leaders. Many who are viewed today as 
"traditional" leaders had their start on the 
farm (Mails 1979,68). 
Nonetheless, agrarian leaders took advan-
tage of the patronage system until they gained 
sufficient independence to compete with the 
Indian bureau for power. Allotments could 
not be mortgaged, so a successful start de-
pended on government aid to buy cattle or 
farm machinery (Trosper 1978; Carlson 1981). 
Many also worked for the Indian Service long 
enough to finance a family spread, as did a 
recent Carlisle graduate who had become a 
"successful ranchman" (Friedman 1909, 53): 
He has a modern two-story house on a very 
large ranch of which he is the owner, and is 
the possessor of 100 cattle and 30 horses. 
[He] was, for several years, a clerk in the 
Indian Service, but abandoned this work 
because, as he states, "I have learned that 
one can do better and earn more money 
using his own resources and working at a 
business of his own." He takes a leading role 
in the councils of his people. 
The first generation of rancher-leaders was 
therefore scarcely distinguishable from the old 
patronage chiefs, except that they used their 
relationship with whites to secure capital 
rather than to win permanent employment. In 
the process, moreover, they assimilated much 
of their patrons' American-style Calvinism, 
including contempt for less motivated Indians. 
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"The time is at hand when every person 
should pay his way," the Lodge Pole Indian 
Stockmen's Association told satisfied Con-
gressmen. "The days of getting something for 
nothing are gone" (U.S. Senate 1934, 296). 
It is also significant that one-third of the 
young Indians who attended Carlisle Indian 
School became farmers and ranchers (Fried-
man 1912, 282), forming the nucleus of an 
educated agrarian bourgeoisie. Agriculture was 
not viewed as a hardship, but as a marriage of 
traditional values and eo nomic autonomy. 
"Cling to your landed estate," Crow rancher 
Robert Yellowtail admonished Carlisle's grad-
uating class seventy years ago. "Sell not a foot 
of it" (Yellowtail 1913,411). "We gained self-
respect," Frank Fools Crow recalls of this 
period, "and were able to maintain much of 
our traditional way of1ife" (Mails 1979, 109).5 
Characteristic of this agrarian movement 
was the appearance of relatively autonomous 
Indian ranchers' associations (Grinnell 1915, 
176-77; U.S. Senate 1934, 295-97). Many were 
cooperatives, pooling land and sharing the 
costs of fencing. For example, the Lodge Pole 
Indian Stockmen's Association on Montana's 
Fort Belknap Reservation fenced nearly thirty 
square miles for its fifty-two members in the 
1920s. The Association also offered an inde-
pendent, voluntary political base for challeng-
ing the Indian Service and its patronage 
leadership by organizing new tribal "business 
councils" and running candidates for tribal 
and state office.6 
INCIPIENT FEUDALISM 
Agrarian prosperity depended not only on 
the allottee's skills as a producer and domestic 
manager but also on his abilities as an organiz-
er. There were economies of scale to be realized 
in ranching and mechanized farming. Larger 
cattle spreads required fewer hands per animal 
and ran much lower risks of overstocking in 
drought years. Larger farms could afford more 
machines and keep them in use more of the 
time, reducing capital and labor costs per 
bushel. Enterprising Indians addressed this by 
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pooling neighboring allotments through sales, 
leases, and wills. On the Flathead Reservation 
in the 1920s, for example, at least 138 of the 
370 individual purchasers of Indian allotments 
were other Indians (U.S. Senate 1929, 
12426-31). 
Not all allottees were so fortunate, how-
ever. Allotments were small by western Ameri-
can standards, offering little leeway for bad 
years or poor management (Leupp 1910, 
79-80; U.S. Senate 1929, 12322). Few pro-
duced a significant surplus (Meriam 1928,491) 
and bank credit was virtually nonexistent. 
Allotments could not be taxed or sold until 
the allottee had been declared "competent to 
manage his own affairs," but in 1917 the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs adopted a policy of 
forcing competency on allottees as quickly as 
possible. Operating difficulties, taxes, and 
pressure to sell out to better-capitalized whites 
rapidly took their toll. By the 1930s about one-
third of the Indians' allotted acreage nation-
wide had been lost and there were an esti-
mated 150,000 landless Indians (U.S. Senate 
1934, 59). 
This piecemeal dispossession led to the 
emergence of a kind of rural Indian working 
class dependent on public relief and migrant 
farm labor for its survival (U.S. Senate 1929, 
12567, 12578, 12637). The Indian Bureau took 
advantage of this state of things to contract 
Indians by the truckload as a cheap alternative 
to Mexican labor in sugar beet and cotton 
fields (U.S. Senate 1929, 12753; Reynolds 
1911; Leupp 1910,90, 155-58). Many of these 
opportunities disappeared in the 1920s, how-
ever, with the widespread use of combines and 
other mechanical harvesters (U.S. Senate 
1929, 12320). Malnutrition and starvation 
threatened growing numbers of Indians, de-
spite the renewal of ration distributions. 
At'the same time, this situation contrib-
uted to the influence of those who had 
succeeded in consolidating their landholdings. 
On the Crow Reservation, for example, eigh-
teen families controlled four thousand cattle 
and eight thousand horses by 1915, when the 
average allottee was fortunate to own fifty 
head. Some individual Blackfeet and Flathead 
ranchers, including leaders of the stockmen's 
associations, owned several thousand head 
apiece, and a few Fort Belknap farmers were 
tilling five times the average acreage of their 
neighbors (Grinnell 1915, 177; U.S. Senate 
1929, 12637; U.S. Senate 1934, 297). Land-
based dynasties emerged, and for the first time 
some Indians found themselves working on 
land owned by other Indians (U .S. Senate 
1929, 12567, 12578). 
Living in some of the least developed 
agrarian regions of the country, landless 
Indians had little possibility of earning enough 
money to reestablish themselves. The unre-
stricted upward mobility of the old hunting 
economy had completely disappeared. Al-
though influence was divided among compet-
ing landowners and their family retainers, it 
was growing increasingly static and, with 
continued consolidation and loss of lands, 
more centralized. This tendency distinguished 
allotted agriculture from traditional foraging 
economies. A successful hunter could leave his 
children nothing but his good name, while a 
successful Indian rancher could leave them his 
estate and thus a head start in acquiring 
influence. 
THE RANCHING COLLAPSE 
Some indication of the economic revolu-
tion taking place in Indian country can be 
found in Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics for 
the decade ending in 1919 (U.S. House 1919, 
748-79). Indian cattle production rose four-
fold, and crop yields nearly sixfold, while 
wages barely doubled and actually fell from 39 
to 19 percent of reservation earned income. 
Only about half of the Indians earning wages 
in 1919 found work outside the Indian Service, 
and per capita wages ($136) were lower than 
per capita earnings from agriculture ($180). 
Indians were working 52 percent of their 
allotted acreage and 69 percent of unallotted 
reservation lands. Only a quarter of total 
Indian income was unearned, i.e., from leasing 
or relief. 
The Indians' agrarian prosperity was short-
lived, however. While the First World War was 
initially a blessing, more than doubling the 
price of beef, it also gave non-Indian ranchers 
an added incentive to expand onto the reser-
vations. Often in collusion with Bureau of 
Indian Affairs employees, a dozen large cattle 
companies were able to buy or lease most of 
the good Indian grazing land in Montana by 
1928 (U.S. Senate 1929, 12314, 12348, 12847). 
A common method was called "checkerboard-
ing": the company would acquire alternating 
parcels over a large area, frequently by intim-
idation, and then force the remaining Indian 
owners to fence or sell out. 
The Indian bureau helped by forcing fee 
patents on allottees, subjecting them to taxes 
they could not afford, and by charging them 
with the costs of reclamation projects from 
which they derived no benefit (U.S. Senate 
1929, 12316, 12383, 12448, 12464, 12670, 
12685, 12747; U.S. Senate 1930). It also 
discontinued credit for cattle purchases and 
encouraged ranchers to switch to farming, 
relocating Indian families from good grazing 
lands, which were then leased, to poor farming 
lands (U.S. Senate 1929, 12522, 12528, 12551, 
12556, 12584, 12601, 12652, 12663, 12751). 
The postwar depression and drought finished 
off most of the Indian ranchers, and many of 
the non-Indians as well (U.S. Senate 1929, 
12336). 
The Northern Cheyennes received their 
first issue of government cattle in 1903. By 
1908 they had made their first deliveries to the 
Chicago stockyards, and by 1912 were running 
over 12,000 head on the reservation (Leupp 
1910, 162; U.S. Senate 1929, 12845). In 1915 
the Indian Service forcibly consolidated all 
herds of individual Cheyennes into a federally 
managed "tribal herd," which by the end of 
the war was down to 4,200 head. Most 
Cheyenne ranchers never recovered. On the 
Blackfeet reservation, the number of cattle 
owned by Indians fell from 60,000 to 2,000 
during the war years (U .S. Senate 1929, 
12684). Once again, the effect was to aggravate 
income disparities. 
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TECHNOCRACY 
The evolution of a landed Indian middle 
class was not only a source of resentment 
among the growing ranks of landless Indians 
but also an increasing irritant to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. Autonomous ranchers' associa-
tions and business councils were viewed as 
"rather a nuisance because [they served] as a 
forum for agitators" (Meriam 1928, 633). Even 
the well-intentioned New Deal reformer, John 
Collier, who was forever impressed with what 
he thought was the traditional Indian way of 
life based on collectivism, could never ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of an Indian middle 
class based on the ownership of private 
property. When in 1933 he proposed retribaliz-
ing reservation lands and restricting the sale 
and inheritance of allotments, Indian ranchers 
accused him of being a "communist" (U.S. 
Senate 1934,365, 3(3). 
In the meantime, a growing number of 
Indians sought economic security in govern-
ment employment. This new generation of 
Indian bureaucrats-a kind of clerical proletar-
iat-was better educated and more American-
ized than the patronage chiefs, and viewed 
both the vestigial patronage system and pros-
perous Indian stockmen as parts of an old 
antidemocratic order. John Collier's proposals 
offered them a fresh economic start, breaking 
the evolving Indian agrarian hegemony and 
returning political power, through the local 
ballot, to a greater number of the people. 
It was increasingly the opinion of white 
reformers that the remaining large private 
Indian cattle holdings were inequitable and 
should be reduced (Meriam 1928, 506). Col-
lier's original proposals emphasized land con-
solidation, rather than the Indians' right to 
form business corporations for economic self-
improvement. To the extent that the promise 
of land reform won the support of the dispos-
sessed, Collier exploited an evolving class 
division within Indian society itself. Indian 
cattlemen naturally viewed all this with alarm. 
The new system would "discourage Indian 
home and stock improvement" by weakening 
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private ownership, representatives of the Na-
vajo, Yakima, and Shoshone tribes told Con-
gress, and would "plac[el in the hands of 
irresponsible Indians too much authority and 
power" (U.S. Senate 1934,405,408,418). 
As Collier's proposed land reforms met 
with stiffer Opposltlon on constitutional 
grounds, the administration shifted its em-
phasis to the idea of reservation self-govern-
ment. i This, however, made little sense to 
existing tribal business councils, who viewed it 
as an extension of the reservation patronage 
system. According to Mary Small, a Southern 
Cheyenne banker (U.S. Senate 1934, 366): 
Self-government to this extent is already 
accomplished through the tribal councils 
and tribal business committees, which, by 
the way, were organized and functioning 
long before Mr. Collier manifested his great 
interest in the Indians in general. As you 
know, at these councils and business meet-
ings, Indians discuss matters they consider 
of vital importance to the tribe and initiate 
measures for the better management of 
their affairs. But, no action of such councils 
or committees may become effective with-
out the approval of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs or Secretary of the Interior. 
Where is the advantage of an almost similar 
system bearing John Collier's name? 
The Indian Reorganization Act nonethe-
less gave the new Indian tribal councils exactly 
those land-reform powers, such as expropri-
ation, that Congress had refused to give 
outright to the Indian Service. Since the 
councils now operated as satraps of the federal 
administrative system, moreover, they also 
offered greatly expanded revolving-door em-
ployment opportunities for Indian techno-
crats. This empowerment of Indian 
bureaucrats evolved into a new patronage 
system based on the reorganized councils' 
regulatory monopoly of economic resources, 
including local employment and relief pay-
ments as well as land and natural resources. 
Reorganized councils also used reconsolidated 
tribal lands as a source of independent operat-
ing income, putting them in direct competition 
with allottees for acreage, capital, and markets. 
Reorganization may also have had impor-
tant external political consequences. Not only 
did land consolidation reduce the economic 
basis for independent Indian political action 
but the new internal elective political and 
patronage system captured the energies of the 
next generation of ambitious young Indians 
and distracted them from participating in the 
wider political system. At the same time, a 
revolving door between the new tribal bu-
reaucracies and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
itself created an enormous supply of relatively 
well-paid, secure jobs, distracting young Indi-
ans from independent enterprise as well as 
from outside private employment.' In net 
effect, reorganization helped recapture and 
recolonize the Indians' economic and political 
efforts. 
CONSOLIDATION 
"Self-determination," the "new" federal 
direction in Indian policy since 1970, has 
consolidated the sociopolitical consequences of 
reorganization by greatly increasing the role of 
the tribal councils as monopoly suppliers of 
employment and financial aid, and there has 
been no offsetting decentralization of land 
ownership. Sixty-five years ago, nearly two-
thirds of reservation Indians' income was 
derived from self-employment and less than 
one-tenth from public employment, but by the 
1970s these proportions had reversed (Barsh 
and Diaz-Knauf 1984). A new class structure 
has emerged, with a middle-class managerial 
elite and a majority of unemployed who lack 
any means of self-sufficiency. Recruitment by 
the managerial class remains with families that 
seek to preserve dependency-the "federal 
trust relationship"-because the election or 
employment of dissenters will simply result in 
administrative obstructions amd reduced fed-
eral aid. 
Change may nonetheless result from de-
clining federal financial support for Indian self-
government. Indian unemployment has risen 
sharply since 1980, and current national 
budget-balancing proposals threaten to reduce 
direct federal aid to Indians by half. Deprived 
of federally financed jobs and relief payments, 
tribal councils will lose most of their hold over 
reservation Indians. Accelerating the devel-
opment of extractive industries such as mining 
or logging, or frustrating landed Indians' 
efforts to rebuild some measure of agrarian self-
sufficiency, will simply add to the erosion of 
their political influence. We may see a return 
to the conditions of the 191Os-increased 
agrarian and private business enterprise, the 
development of independent Indian commu-
nity associations, and a significant reentry of 
reservation Indians into off-reservation poli-
tics. 
SOME COMPARISONS 
What lessons can be learned from this 
experience? Perhaps the most important one 
concerns the potential for economic and class 
antagonisms to energize political change-and 
not necessarily for the best, as when the new 
options are structures designed by outsiders. 
On the contemporary scene, there is growing 
antagonism between the tribal technocracy-
no longer a proletariat but a relatively priv-
ileged and entrenched professional elite-and 
jobless Indians, who represent today's equiva-
lent of the landless Indians of the 1930s. In 
both instances, the motivating force has been 
external: federal land allotment policies in the 
1930s, government aid reductions today. 
It would be useful to compare the socio-
economic histories of Indian reservations in 
the Great Plains to those in the Pacific 
Northwest, where most Indians remained 
fishermen and there was only limited allot-
ment-chiefly of forest lands. There appears to 
have been a similar emergence and collapse of 
an independent entrepreneurial middle class, 
based on family ownership of fishing vessels 
and small sawmills. Federal consolidation of 
forest management units and the development 
of tribal logging and milling monopolies de-
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stroyed a number of these family fortunes in 
the 1940s and 1950s, and more recently there 
have been efforts to tribalize (nationalize) 
Indian fishing. The effect, once again, has been 
to shift political power from enterprising 
Indian families to tribal technocrats. 
In many developing countries, agrarian 
movements are engaged in similar struggles 
with urban technocrats, promoting national-
ization and industrialization at the expense of 
the self-sufficiency of the countryside. There 
are some important differences, of course. In 
Asia, much of Latin America, and parts of 
Africa, the contemporary agrarian system still 
embodies elements of feudalism, and there is as 
much of a struggle between agrarian and 
industrial capitalism as there is between partic-
ipatory economic organization and centraliza-
tion. Yet while the agrarian movements in 
these countries tend to place great emphasis on 
class unity among peasants, their leadership is 
often recruited from the rural middle class of 
smaller landowners. When the propertied 
middle class evolves into the major threat to 
established power, established power tries to 
enlist the poor against it. 
When we hear it said today that Indians do 
not believe in property or in private enterprise, 
we are still hearing the echoes of the struggle 
against Indian agrarian entrepreneurs in the 
1930s-a struggle waged in the name of liberat-
ing landless Indians from poverty, but which 
in reality returned reservation economies to 
government dependence. If the next decade 
sees a renewed Indian agrarian movement, it 
will inevitably result, at least temporarily, in 
renewed tensions between successful families 
and other Indians, and in the renewal of old 
political antagonism that could once again 
defeat the possibility of economic indepen-
dence and autonomous political participation. 
NOTES 
1. More detailed models of traditional plains 
political systems may be found in Barsh (1986) and 
Miller (1955), and a particularly good description of 
Crow political life may be found in Voget (1984, 
49-54). These models should not be applied uncriti-
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cally to more authoritarian Indian societies, such as 
farmers of the irrigated Southwest. 
2. "Family" is used here rather loosely, owing to 
the great variety of tribal political structures. 
Among Lakota, the most appropriate unit of 
analysis would be the tiyospme, which served as 
both a collective economic unit and as a unit of 
political representation and as such remained 
largely autonomous. 
3. We should not underestimate, however, the 
stabilizing role of organizations of women that 
underlay the family structure, particularly where 
clan membership passed matrilineally. 
4. The same general observations should apply 
to other foraging societies, to fishermen, and to 
horticulturalists lacking centralized industrial infra-
structure (such as irrigation) or specialization of 
labor. 
5. But compare Wissler's (1938, 234) portrait of 
a successful Indian rancher who, being neither 
Indian nor white, committed suicide out of frustra-
tion. 
6. Agricultural fairs, originally promoted by the 
Indian Service as a means of stimulating individual 
competition (Leupp 1910, 159-62), evolved into 
today's powwows and became a major theater for 
Indian political activity. 
7. There was widespread concern that radical 
land reform would violate the Fifth Amendment's 
prohibition against the taking of private property 
without just compensation and thus trigger a new 
round of Indian claims litigation against the govern-
ment. See, generally, the discussion of the New Deal 
by Barsh and Henderson (1980). 
8. By the 1970s, Indians were a majority of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs' employees, but were 
disproportionately concentrated in lower grades 
(Barsh 1980). 
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